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Constitutional Flaw? 
by Carl E. Schneider 
D o terminally ill patients have a constitutional right "to decide, 
without FDA interference, 
whether to assume the risks of using po-
tentially life-saving investigational drugs 
that the FDA has yet to approve for 
commercial marketing, but that the 
FDA has determined, after Phase I clin-
ical human trials, are safe enough for 
further testing"? In Abigail Alliance for 
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. 
McClellan, the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia said 
"no."1 In Abigail Alliance for Better Access 
to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschen-
bach, a panel (three judges) of the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit said "yes" 
(with one dissent).2 But when the full 
appeals court reconsidered the panel's 
decision, it said "no" (with two dis-
sents).3 
Where in the Constitution might 
such a right be found? If anywhere, in 
the fifth amendment's due process 
clause: "No person shall be ... deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law." This clause might seem 
only to impose procedural limits on how 
the government may take your life, lib-
erty, or property. Nevertheless, twice in 
American history the Supreme Court 
has believed that the clause imposes sub-
stantive as well as procedural limits-
that the clause limits what government 
may do as well as how it may do it. 
The first period of "substantive due 
process" was the opening decades of the 
twentieth century, when the Court an-
nounced a person's right "to his person-
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al liberty, . . . to enter into those con-
tracts . . . which may seem to him ap-
propriate." For example, New York 
sought to protect bakers' lungs by for-
bidding their employers to make them 
work more than sixty hours a week. The 
Court thought the statute "an unreason-
able, unnecessary, and arbitrary interfer-
ence with the right of the individual to 
his personal liberty'' because bakers are 
"equal in intelligence and capacity to 
men in other trades" and can "assert 
their rights and care for themselves 
without the protecting arm of the state, 
interfering with their independence of 
judgment and of action. They are in no 
sense wards of the state."4 
The second period of substantive due 
process began roughly with Roe v. Wade 
and continues today. 5 The scope of 
today's clause is cloudy and controver-
sial, but on one view it embodies a right 
to make important intimate decisions, 
like choices about abortion, contracep-
tion, marrying, and raising children. 
Both versions of substantive due 
process protect individual autonomy as 
contemporaneously understood. But 
most law limits someone's autonomy in 
some way. Is most law really made un-
constitutional by this expansive inter-
pretation of the due process clause? 
Of course not. For one thing, gov-
ernment may infringe any constitution-
al right with adequate justification. As 
Justice Holmes famously said, "The 
most stringent protection of free speech 
would not protect a man falsely shout-
ing fire in a theater and causing a 
panic." But infringements of constitu-
tiona! rights must generally meet a for-
bidding standard of justification. Can 
the Court really subject all legislation to 
that high standard? 
Of course not. So the Court (some-
what erratically) uses a sorting device. 
When the government infringes a "fun-
damental" right, it must meet an oner-
ous standard of justification-the in-
fringement must be "necessary'' to serve 
a "compelling state interest." Where the 
right is not fundamental, the govern-
ment need only show that its infringe-
ment is "rationally related" to a "legiti-
mate state interest." These terms are 
marvelously vague, but they are almost 
(in the law's cant) "outcome determina-
tive." In practice, the government can 
rarely show a compelling state interest 
and can almost always show a legitimate 
state interest. 
What makes a right "fundamental"? 
In Washington v. Glucksberg (the assist-
ed-suicide case), the Court said that first 
it "carefully'' defines the right.6 Second, 
it asks whether the right is '"deeply root-
ed in this Nation's history and tradition' 
. .. and 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they were sac-
rificed."' 
So is the Abigail Alliance right "fun-
damental"? The Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act requires that the FDA ap-
prove new drugs, ordinarily in three 
phases. "A Phase I study usually consists 
of twenty to eighty subjects and is 'de-
signed to determine the metabolism and 
pharmacologic actions of the [new] 
drug in humans, the side effects associ-
ated with increasing doses, and, if possi-
ble, to gain early evidence on effective-
ness."'? The Abigail Alliance-"an orga-
nization of terminally ill patients and 
their supporters" -sought access to de-
velopmental drugs by making the con-
stitutional claim we began with. 
The appeals court (rather skeptically) 
"assume[d] arguendo that the Alliance's 
description of its asserted right would 
satisfy Glucksbergs 'careful description' 
requirement." The court then addressed 
the Alliance's "history and tradition'' ar-
gument. First, it evaluated "the Al-
liance's claim ... that 'common law and 
historical American practices have tradi-
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tionally trusted individual doctors and 
their patients with almost complete au-
tonomy to evaluate the efficacy of med-
ical treatments."' The court said that 
even if drug efficacy had not historically 
been regulated, drug safety had been. 
Furthermore, in 1962 the FDCA was 
amended "to explicitly require that the 
FDA only approve drugs deemed effec-
tive," and even before that "at least some 
drug regulation ... addressed efficacy." 
The court then examined the Al-
liance's argument that the FDCA is "in-
consistent with the way that our legal 
tradition treats persons in all other life-
threatening situations. . . . Specifically, 
the Alliance argues that three doc-
trines-(!) the doctrine of necessity; (2) 
the tort of intentional interference with 
rescue; and (3) the right to self-de-
fense--each support the recognition of 
a right to self-preservation." The court 
briskly found these (somewhat obscure) 
doctrines inapposite. In sum, the right 
the Alliance asserted was not "funda-
mental." 
Because the right was not fundamen-
tal, the FDA only had to meet the low 
standard of justification. No problem: 
[P] rior to distribution of a drug 
outside of controlled studies, the 
Government has a rational basis for 
ensuring that there is a scientifically 
and medically acceptable level of 
knowledge about the risks and ben-
efits of such a drug. We therefore 
hold that the FDA's policy of limit-
ing access to investigational drugs is 
rationally related to the legitimate 
state interest of protecting patients, 
including the terminally ill, from 
potentially unsafe drugs with un-
known therapeutic effects. 
The dissent was angry, even (by judicial 
standards) nasty. It contended that the 
"carefully defined" right was not the one 
the court had attributed to the Alliance 
but rather the right to attempt to pre-
serve one's own life. The dissent not 
only described a history and tradition of 
respecting that right; it almost implied 
that the "history and tradition" test was 
supererogatory because the right had a 
basis in the actual words of the Consti-
tution, and indeed in the due process 
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clause itself: "No person shall be ... de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process oflaw." 
In some ways, the dissent has the bet-
ter of the argument. It is 
startling that the oft-limited rights 
to marry, to fornicate, to have chil-
dren, to control the education and 
upbringing of children, to perform 
varied sexual acts in private, and to 
control one's own body even if it re-
sults in one's own death or the death 
of a fetus have all been deemed fun-
damental rights covered, although 
not always protected, by the Due 
Process Clause, but the right to try 
to save one's life is left out in the 
cold despite its textual anchor in the 
right to life. 
Furthermore, preventing patients from 
deciding what risks to take is hard to 
reconcile with the standard precept that 
patients have a right to evaluate medical 
risks for themselves. 
Yet what should we make of a consti-
tutional test which is so wondrously ma-
nipulable? For example, much turns on 
how broadly you define your right. The 
right of terminally ill people to (possi-
bly) lifesaving drugs that have survived a 
phase I trial looks little like the kind of 
claim constitutions are written to secure, 
while the right to protect one's life goes 
to the very reason governments are cre-
ated. Similarly, a right to commit suicide 
crumbles against centuries of the canon 
'gainst self-slaughter, but a right to de-
cide when your life is worth living res-
onates with much that makes us cherish 
autonomy. No wonder the Abigail Al-
liance majority said, "As such rights are 
not set forth in the language of the Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court has cau-
tioned against expanding the substantive 
rights protected by the Due Process 
Clause 'because guideposts for responsi-
ble decisionmaking in this unchartered 
area are scarce and openended."' 
Whatever one thinks of this classic 
jurisprudential controversy, one should 
be relieved that the dissent lost. Had it 
prevailed, courts would have been 
launched into work dangerously beyond 
their competence. For instance, how can 
judges-who have little science and less 
medicine--evaluate the FDA's decisions 
about new drugs? As Rebecca Dresser 
observed in her acute analysis of the 
panel's decision, that court's understand-
mgwas 
deficient in several ways. The ma-
jority seems to assume that most 
drugs that get through phase I test-
ing will eventually be approved be-
cause their expected benefits will 
outweigh harms. The judges also 
seem to assume that phase I testing, 
which primarily examines safety, 
yields high-quality data on effective-
ness. They seem to assume, too, 
that data from twenty to eighty 
people can supply sufficient evi-
dence for patients and doctors to 
make informed decisions about new 
agents.8 
This is not to say that the FDA's rules 
for approving new drugs are ideal or 
even sound. A considerable and forceful 
literature criticizes them, and the FDA 
itself has proposed changes.9 But the 
best cure for regulatory error is rarely an-
other layer of regulation. Balancing the 
risks against the benefits of approving a 
new drug quickly is an impossible job. If 
the FDA-with its expertise and experi-
ence-is getting it wrong, why would 
the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia-with neither ex-
pertise nor experience nor, for that mat-
ter, useful constitutional guidance-do 
better? 
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